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Abstract
This paper examines the eﬀectiveness of the new liquidity facilities that the Fed-
eral Reserve established in response to the recent ﬁnancial crisis. I develop a no-
arbitrage based aﬃne term structure model with default risk and conduct a thorough
factor analysis of the counterparty default risk among major ﬁnancial institutions and
the underlying mortgage default risk. The new facilities’ eﬀectiveness is examined,
by ﬁrst separately examining their eﬀects in relieving ﬁnancial institutions’ liquidity
concerns and reducing the counterparty risk premiums, and then quantifying their
overall eﬀects in reducing ﬁnancial strains in the inter-bank money market.
Empirical results indicate that the Term Auction Facility (TAF) has a strong
eﬀect in reducing ﬁnancial strains in the inter-bank money market, primarily through
relieving ﬁnancial institutions’ liquidity concerns. Heightened uncertainty regarding
the macroeconomy, ﬁnancial markets, and mortgage default risk have signiﬁcantly
raised counterparty risk premiums among ﬁnancial institutions, but have had little
eﬀect on their liquidity premiums. The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF)
and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), however, are found to have had
less discernible eﬀects so far in relieving ﬁnancial strains in the Libor market. This
is consistent with market observations of a weaker interest from primary dealers in
participating in the TSLF auctions than banks have shown in tapping the TAF.
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Since early August 2007, ﬁnancial markets in the U.S. and Europe have undergone a sustained
period of ﬁnancial distress, originating from the meltdown of the subprime mortgage market.
During this period of turbulences, short-term ﬁnancing costs have at times jumped precipitously.
For instance, the 3-month unsecured Libor spread over the Overnight Inter-bank Swap (OIS)
rate, a measure often used to gauge the tension in inter-bank money market, jumped from under
10 basis points in early August 2007 to almost 100 basis points within a month (Chart 1).
In response to the rapidly deteriorating ﬁnancial conditions, central banks around the world
resorted to the conventional monetary policy toolbox at ﬁrst, including the Federal Reserve’s
eﬀorts in cutting the discount rate and extending the terms of loans through discount window.
As it became apparent that conventional tools were not eﬀective enough in addressing unusual
ﬁnancial distress, the Federal Reserve introduced several new facilities including the Term Auc-
tion Facility (TAF) to provide liquidity to the market. Some other central banks, such as Bank
of Canada, the European Central Bank, and the Swiss National Bank also took measures to
increase term lending. Despite these eﬀorts, however, considerable strains in the money market
remained through the spring of 2008.
This situation naturally leads to a debate about the eﬀectiveness of these new liquidity
facilities. In particular, while several Federal Reserve oﬃcials including Mishkin (February 15,
2008) state that the Term Auction Facility (TAF), “may have had signiﬁcant beneﬁcial eﬀects on
ﬁnancial markets,” some other researchers are less conﬁdent. In a recent working paper, Taylor
and William (2008) claim that they have not found evidence suggesting that the TAF has helped
relieve the strains. This controversy calls for a careful examination of the eﬀectiveness of these
new liquidity facilities, which is the focus of the current paper.
Financial strains in the inter-bank money market can result from either heightened counter-
party default risk among ﬁnancial institutions, or increased liquidity demand, both leading to an
increased unwillingness of ﬁnancial ﬁrms to lend to each other and a rise in the posted borrowing
costs. To fully evaluate the TAF and other liquidity facilities, we need to examine their eﬀects
on both dimensions. This turns out to be very challenging, as neither the counterparty risk nor
liquidity demand is directly observable, or has readily available proxies. More importantly, con-
ditions in subprime mortgage and overall ﬁnancial markets have deteriorated substantially since
the beginning of the ﬁnancial stress, and the monetary policy and macroeconomic environment
1have also changed considerably. These factors make it very diﬃcult to identify the eﬀects of
the new liquidity facilities from those of the deteriorating ﬁnancial market and macroeconomic
conditions.
To address these problems, I use real-time ﬁnancial market evaluations of default risk for
various ﬁnancial institutions to measure counterparty risk and mortgage default risk. In partic-
ular, I conduct a thorough factor analysis to examine variation of systematic default risk among
major commercial banks and investment banks, as well as the systematic default risk among
ﬁrms heavily exposed to subprime mortgage risk. I then analyze the eﬀectiveness of the Federal
Reserve’s new liquidity facilities, by ﬁrst separately examining their eﬀects in relieving ﬁnan-
cial institutions’ liquidity concerns and in reducing the counterparty risk premiums, and then
quantifying their overall eﬀects in reducing ﬁnancial strains in the inter-bank money market.
The speciﬁcations of the regression models and choice of regressors are guided by a no-arbitrage
based aﬃne term structure model with default risk that is developed in the paper.
The empirical results suggest that the Term Auction Facility (TAF) has strong eﬀects in
relieving the liquidity concerns in the inter-bank money market, yet has little eﬀect in lowering
the counterparty risk premiums among major ﬁnancial institutions. On the other hand, most
of the variation in systematic counterparty risk premiums can be attributed to heightened un-
certainty regarding the macroeconomy, ﬁnancial markets, and underlying mortgage default risk,
which appear to have had little eﬀect on banks’ demand for liquidity.
When I combine these eﬀects and account for the possible correlations between counterparty
risk premiums and banks’ liquidity concerns, I ﬁnd that the TAF has, on average, reduced the
1-month Libor-OIS spread by at least 31 basis points, and the 3-month Libor-OIS spread by
at least 44 basis points. This provides evidence suggesting that the TAF has helped relieve
ﬁnancial stress in the inter-bank money market. The other two newly introduced liquidity
facilities, the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility
(PDCF), are found to have less discernible eﬀect so far on Libor-OIS spreads, consistent with
the market observations of a weaker interest from the primary dealers in participating in the
TSLF auctions.
The broad contour of this analysis is consistent with recent research on credit-default risk and
no-arbitrage based Credit Default Swap (CDS) pricing, as well as on the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy, and has a direct bearing on asset pricing literature and monetary economics.
2More recently, Taylor and Williams (2008) and McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008) address
the same questions as this paper but arrive at diﬀerent conclusions. There are three distinctive
features of my study that can possibly explain this discrepancy. First, I examine the overall
eﬀects of the TAF and other facilities since they were established, whereas the other two papers
take an event-study approach and focus on the TAF’s eﬀect on some speciﬁc days, either the
bid submission days (Taylor and Williams), or the TAF announcement day and the following
auction days (McAndrews et. al.). Both of these two papers assume that the TAF has no
eﬀect on the other trading days. Second, I conduct a thorough factor analysis to examine the
systematic counterparty risk among major ﬁnancial institutions, based on which the empirical
regressions are conducted. I also control for the systematic mortgage default risk and various
uncertainties regarding the macroeconomy and ﬁnancial markets in examining the TAF and
the TSLF eﬀect, which are ignored by the other authors. Finally, I separate the new facilities’
eﬀects in lowering the counterparty risk premiums from those relieving liquidity concerns, similar
to Bank of England (2007) and McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008), although my analysis
is along a completely diﬀerent approach and makes less restrictive assumptions. In contrast,
Taylor and Williams (2008) dismiss the liquidity concerns and only focus on the counterparty
risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief chronology of ﬁnancial
market developments around the establishment of the TAF and other new liquidity facilities,
and discusses the transmission mechanisms through which these new facilities may possibly
work. Section 3 formulates a no-arbitrage based aﬃne term structure model with default risk,
providing a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis. Section 4 examines the eﬀects of the
Federal Reserve’s new liquidity facilities, ﬁrst separately on their eﬀects in relieving the liquidity
concerns and in reducing the counterparty risk, and then their overall eﬀects in reducing the
ﬁnancial strains in the money market. It also examines the TAF auction-day eﬀect. Section 5
concludes.
2. A Chronology of Financial Developments in 2007-2008
2.1. Financial Conditions Prior to the TAF
The ongoing ﬁnancial crisis has deep roots in the deterioration of sub-prime mortgage market
conditions, which began to emerge in late 2006 and early 2007. On February 7, 2007, New
3Century Financial Corp. announced a restatement of its 2006 performance from a proﬁtt oa
substantial loss, which was followed by a number of hedge funds failures and writedowns from
investment banks, mainly suﬀering from the collapse of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) and
other related ﬁnancial derivatives. However, the crisis did not spread to money market until
several months later. On August 9, 2007, the French investment bank BNP halted redemptions
from three of its subsidiary mutual funds, and in response to this event, overnight interest rates
shot up in European and U.S. money markets.
The deterioration of the inter-bank market conditions had greatly impaired the stability of
short-term funding markets and posed severe challenges to central banks’ ability to provide ample
liquidity through regular monetary policy channels. For example, under normal circumstances,
the Federal Reserve has two ways to inject liquidity into the market, through open market
operations, and by lending at its discount window. However, as explained below, these had not
adequately addressed the unusual ﬁnancial market distress this time.
Open market operations are the most powerful and frequently used policy tool by the Federal
Reserve to inject liquidity into market, at a rate close to the target rate set by the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC). On the open market, the Federal Reserve trades with a selected
set of “primary dealers,” through direct purchases or sales of Treasury or government agency
securities, or repurchase agreements against such securities. The liquidity is then redistributed
by these dealers to other ﬁnancial institutions in the inter-bank money market, and ﬁnally
spreads to other sectors of the economy. However, during periods of marked ﬁnancial turmoil
like that since the summer of 2007, a heightened reluctance for banks to lend to each other in
the inter-bank money market will interrupt this process and can lead to a credit crunch that
may slow the overall economy.
The second tool used by the Federal Reserve to supply liquidity is the discount window.
Sound depository institutions in need of extra liquidity can go to the Federal Reserve and obtain
funding, through fully collateralized overnight loans, at a rate usually higher than the federal
funds rate. From 2003 through the summer of 2007, the discount rate had been maintained at
100 basis points above the federal funds rate target.
In response to the soaring strains in the money market, the Federal Reserve narrowed the
discount rate premium, from 100 basis points to 50 basis points on August 17, 2007, immediately
after the initial jump in money-market interest rates, and further down to 25 basis points on
4March 17, 2008. The terms of loans through discount window were also extended to up to thirty
days in August 2007 and further extended to ninety days later, and such loans are renewable
at the request of the borrowers. These measures were taken to encourage banks’ borrowing
through the discount window. However, their eﬀects had been modest, due to the so-called
“stigma” problem: during a ﬁnancial crisis, the banks may be reluctant to borrow from the
discount window, worrying that such actions would be interpreted by the market as a sign of
their ﬁnancial weakness, which would reduce their ability to borrow from the market.
2.2. The Creation of the TAF and Other Liquidity Facilities
As the strains in term funding markets persisted and became particularly elevated in early
December, the Federal Reserve introduced a new lending facility, namely, the Term Auction
Facility (TAF). With this new facility, the Federal Reserve auctions a pre-announced amount
of credit, twice in each month, to eligible depository institutions that are in sound ﬁnancial
condition, for a term of one month (28 days or 35 days) instead of overnight. The TAF accepts
the same kind of collateral as the discount window. The amount of the credit was initially set
at $20 billion for each auction, and was then increased to $30 billion in January 2008 and $50
billion in March 2008.
In addition to the TAF, two new lending facilities were also created in March 2008 to serve
as extra channels in providing liquidity to ﬁnancial institutions in need. On March 11, 2008, the
Federal Reserve announced the creation of Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), oﬀering to
lend to its primary dealers, including non-depository institutions, Treasury securities through
weekly auctions with total amount up to $200 billion, for a term of 28 days. Speciﬁcally, in ex-
change for lending Treasuries, the TSLF accepts AAA/Aaa-rated private-label mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) and asset-backed securities as collateral. The ﬁrst auction was conducted on
March 27, 2008, with an oﬀering size of $75 billion. As the Federal Reserve states, the purpose
of the TSLF is to “promote liquidity in the ﬁnancing markets for Treasury and other collateral
and thus foster the functioning of ﬁnancial markets more generally.”
Finally, on March 16, 2008, the Federal Reserve announced that it would establish a Primary
Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), which authorizes overnight loans to its primary dealers at the
discount rate secured by eligible investment-grade securities. This facility essentially extends
the discount window, which has been only opened to depository institutions, to non-depository
5ﬁnancial institutions including investment banks. The facility, “will be in place for at least six
months.” Table 1 compares the main features of these three new liquidity facilities with those
of the regular open market operations and the discount window.
2.3. Transmission Mechanism (Why Should The New Facilities Work?)
In the several weeks following the establishment of the TAF on December 12, 2007, credit
conditions in the inter-bank market improved substantially. As Chart 1 shows, the 1-month
Libor spread over the Overnight Inter-bank Swap (OIS) rate dropped sharply from the peak of
111 basis points in early December to below 30 basis points in late January. However, the spread
bounced back in early March to about 60 basis points and continued to rise since, exceeding 80
basis points in mid-April. The early spring upswing has raised doubts about the eﬀectiveness
of the TAF and the other two new facilities.
During a ﬁnancial turmoil, banks become increasingly reluctant to lend to each other for
two reasons. First, counterparty risk or default risk increases as the uncertainty around the
counterparty’s ﬁnancial conditions rises. Second, banks tend to build up precautionary liquidity
as uncertainty about the market value of their own assets (e.g., structured credit products)
mounts. The cost and availability of funding to keep these structured products on their balance
sheet has also tightened. Furthermore, fund managers may also demand extra liquidity readily
available to cover potential redemptions.1 Heightened counterparty risk and extra liquidity
demand lead to an increased unwillingness to lend and has likely contributed to the jumps in
inter-bank interest rates.
By establishing lending facilities that are ready to provide funding to ﬁnancial institutions in
need, the Federal Reserve has sought to relieve the ﬁnancial strains through several channels. The
ﬁrst and most direct channel is to serve as an additional funding source for banks in immediate
need of liquidity, thereby lowering the short-term borrowing costs. Second, because the new
facilities reduce pressure on banks to liquidate their assets, these facilities should lessen further
upward pressures on their funding costs induced by deteriorations in money market conditions.
This may contribute to a decline in the counterparty risk, ceteris paribus, and thereby lower risk
1More speciﬁcally, these are concerns over funding liquidity, i.e., risks when an institution is unable to raise
cash to hold its balance-sheet position, rather than a trading liquidity,w h i c ho f t e nr e f e r st od i ﬃc u l t i e st oe x e c u t e
a transaction at the prevailing market price due to a temporary lack of appetite for the transaction by other
traders on the market.
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a given unit of risk, i.e., the risk price may decline in the presence of the TAF. Thus the risk
premium, which is the product of risk compensation per unit of risk and perceived amount of
risk, should also decline. Finally, with this additional funding source readily available, there
is less demand for banks to excessively hoard liquidity purely out of individual precautionary
concerns.
The new liquidity facilities do not increase the total reserves in the system. The reason is
simple: to keep the federal funds rate at the target level, after each TAF auction the Federal
Reserve will conduct an opposite transaction on the open market, to maintain the total reserves
unchanged (Chart 2). Based on this observation, Taylor and Williams (2008) suggest that the
TAF should not work in reducing the ﬁnancial strains, because the total amount of liquidity has
not increased.
However, under the current disrupted market conditions, the eﬀectiveness of the TAF and
other liquidity facilities depends on whether they can resolve the misallocation of liquidity in
the market, not necessarily how much net overall reserves the Federal Reserve is injecting into
the market. Recall that the current credit crunch results from an increased unwillingness among
the banks to lend to each other, due to both heightened counterparty risk and elevated liquidity
demand. Therefore, it is the misallocation of liquidity, not the lack of total reserves, that is
aﬄicting the market. By providing short-term funding to banks in immediate need of liquidity
through these new facilities while absorbing the excess reserves from the others on the open
market, the Federal Reserve serves as an intermediary between these ﬁnancial institutions, with
a goal of trying to achieve a more eﬃcient allocation of liquidity without changing the total
supply of reserves in the system.
In summary, there are reasons to believe that the TAF and the other new liquidity facilities
could and should eﬀectively alleviate ﬁnancial strains in the inter-bank money market.
3. A No-arbitrage based Term Structure Model of LIBOR Rates with Default
Risk
Let us describe the economy by ﬁxing a ﬁltered probability space {Ω,F,P} and a family {Ft :
t ≥ 0} of σ-algebra. In particular, assume that an N-dimensional vector Ft can describe the
7state of the economy and follows an aﬃne diﬀusion process under the physical measure P:
dFt = −κ(Θ − Ft)dt + Σ
p
StdWt (3.1)
where Θ is the long-run mean of Ft and κ controls the mean-reverting speed. Σ is a full-ranked
matrix and St a diagonal matrix with the i-th diagonal elements deﬁned as
[St]ii = αii + β0
iiFt (3.2)
for some N × N diagonal matrices α and β. Wt denotes a standard Wiener process.
I further deﬁne Ft =[ F0
rt,F0
dt]0, where Frt are state variables that determine the default-free
bond yields. These may include latent factors such as level, slope, curvature as found in term
structure literature, or interest rates of diﬀerent maturities as in the “interest rate only” model
in Duﬃe and Kan (1996), and macro factors as examined in macro-ﬁnance literature such as
Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Wu (2006), and Rudebusch and Wu (2007), etc. Fdt includes state
variables that are related to default risk. Therefore, the default-free instantaneous interest rate
can be written as
rt = δ0 + δ0
1Frt. (3.3)
Furthermore, I assume the following recursive structure for κ and Σ to keep the default-free












The absence of arbitrage opportunity and an assumption of a complete market ensure the
existence of a unique pricing kernel Mt under the physical measure, which is assumed to follow
dMt
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= −rt − λ0
tdWt (3.5)
where λt = λ0+λ0








that is, the risk price for covering default-free interest rate risks only depends on the default-free
term structure factors Frt.
With this aﬃne risk-price speciﬁcation, the factor dynamics remain aﬃne under risk-neutral
measure Q
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Now let us switch to the pricing of the defaultable bonds. Here I follow Duﬃe and Singleton





(rs + gs)ds)|Ft],( 3 . 1 2 )
where gt denotes the instantaneous default spread, which is the product of a hazard rate ht (the
instantaneous default probability) and a fractional loss lt,a n df o l l o w sa na ﬃne process
gt = δD
0 + δD0
1 Ft.( 3 . 1 3 )
Note that the instantaneous default spread gt is a function of Ft, i.e., both the default-free term
structure factors Frt and other state variables that are related to default risk Fdt.T h u s t h e
price of the τ-period defaultable zero-coupon bond is also exponential aﬃne
bD
τt =e x p ( AD
τ − BD0
τ Ft) (3.14)
where the factor loadings AD
τ and BD
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Hence, the default spread on this τ-period defaultable zero-coupon bond is
rD






























rτ are the defaultable bond’s factor loadings on Frt and Fdt, respectively.
A Credit Default Swap (CDS) is a contract that provides insurance against the risk of a
default by particular company. The buyer of the CDS makes periodic payments to the seller
until the end of the life of the CDS. Should the company fail to meet its obligations, the buyer is
paid the face value in exchange for the underlying securities or simply a cash equivalent for the
loss. Therefore, the CDS rate serves as an insurance premium, and a higher CDS rate simple
indicates that the market is demanding higher premiums to cover the associated default risk.
If we assume that there are no liquidity concerns in the CDS market and that the guarantee
will always be honored, then the no-arbitrage condition will ensure that a τ-period CDS rate


















i.e., an aﬃne function of the underlying state variables.
4. Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis consists of the following steps. First, I will assess the TAF’s eﬀect in
lowering money market liquidity premiums, by controlling for variation in systematic counter-
party risk premiums. I then examine the eﬀects of the TAF and other facilities in reducing
counterparty risk premiums. Finally I account for the possible correlations between liquidity
and counterparty risk premiums and evaluate the overall eﬀect of the TAF and the TSLF and
PDCF. The sample runs from January 1, 2007 to April 24, 2008, a total of 344 trading days.
The speciﬁcation of the regression equations is guided by the theoretical model in Section 3.
In particular, equations (3.18) and (3.19) suggest that, in the absence of liquidity concerns and
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the CDS rate of the same maturity, and that both are linear functions of the underlying default
and default-free term structure factors. Therefore, I adopt the following regression model
Lt = α1 + β1 ∗ rCDS
t + β1,TAF ∗ TAF + ut (4.1)
where Lt denotes the 1-month or 3-month Libor-OIS spread. rCDS
t represents the systematic
default risk among ﬁnancial institutions. TAF is a dummy for the Term Auction Facility, and ut
is the regression residuals, both capturing the liquidity concerns and other market distortions.
The coeﬃcient of the CDS rate is not restricted to one, because the maturity of the available
CDS rate is much longer than 1 or 3 months (the most popular CDS contracts are set for a
ﬁve year maturity). Next, I will explore the determination of the systematic counterparty risk
premiums by regressing rCDS
t on a set of state variables Xt,
rCDS
t = α2 + β2Xt + β2,TAF ∗ TAF + ξt (4.2)
as equation (3.19) suggests. Finally, a comprehensive investigation of the determination of the
Libor spreads will be conducted by running the following regression
Lt = α + βXXt + βTAF ∗ TAF + εt (4.3)
as I substitute equation (3.19) into (4.1).
There are several important data measurement issues that need to be addressed in estimating
these equations. First, throughout the empirical analysis, I use the 1-month and 3-month Libor
spreads over the Overnight Inter-bank Swap (OIS) rate to measure the funding strains in the
inter-bank money market. The OIS rate closely matches the average of the expected overnight
interest rate over the contract maturity and is a good measure of the prevailing default-free term
loan rate. Thus the Libor-OIS spread measures the premium that the market demands to cover
the default risk on Libor loans, as well as the compensation for risk associated with the lender’s
liquidity demand.2 The 1-month or 3-month Treasury bill rates, although being the natural
choice to measure the default-free interest rates during normal time, are less desirable here
2The Libor rate is quoted everyday at 11:00 a.m. GMT, i.e., 6:00 a.m. EST, whereas the OIS rate is quoted
at 4:30 p.m. EST, which is a whole U.S. trading day later than when the Libor is determined. To account for
this discrepancy, I also deﬁned alternative Libor-OIS spreads using previous day’s OIS rate, and obtained very
similar estimates of the TAF and the TSLF eﬀects (I thank John Driscoll for making this suggestion).
11because during periods of ﬁnancial turbulence, they are aﬀected by shifts in liquidity preference
associated with “ﬂight to quality” eﬀects.
Secondly, in deﬁning the TAF dummy variable, I treat the establishment of the TAF as
signaling the beginning a new “regime” in the money market. Accordingly, the TAF dummy is
set to one for all trading days since December 12, 2007, and zero for all days prior. This diﬀers
from the other studies, such as Taylor and Williams (2008) and McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang
(2008), which, in order to evaluate the TAF’s eﬀect on some speciﬁc days (bidding days as in
Taylor and Williams and announcement and auction days in McAndrews et.al), deﬁne a dummy
taking the value of one only on the TAF bidding or auction days and zero otherwise, including
both the pre-TAF trading days and the non-bidding days after the TAF was established. In
contrast, since this study aims to quantify the overall eﬀect of the TAF, I naturally chose to set
the dummy value to zero only for the pre-TAF days and one thereafter.
Thirdly, I also deﬁne a dummy variable for the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), in
the same way that the TAF dummy is deﬁned. On the other hand, I do not deﬁne a separate
dummy for the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), because its targeted customers are the
same as the TSLF (both are for primary dealers), and the facility was introduced around the
same time that the TSLF was established. These two reasons make it very diﬃcult to distinguish
between the eﬀects of these two facilities, which are not the focus of this study.
Finally, when quantifying the default risk, instead of using the CDS rates for individual
banks and investment banks as in Taylor and Williams (2008), I use a measure of systematic
default risk premiums. In particular, I extract the ﬁrst principal component of the individual
CDS rates from a group of the largest U.S. commercial banks (Chart 3), and use it to proxy
the systematic default risk premiums for these banks. Similarly, a systematic default risk factor
is also constructed for major investment banks and is included in the regressions (Chart 4).
These factors turn out to capture the co-movement of the CDS rates for individual banks and
investment banks very well. For instance, the single factor extracted from the seven largest U.S.
commercial banks captures 97 percent of total variation in their individual CDS rates, and the
single factor extracted from the top ﬁve U.S. investment banks can explain almost 98 percent
of their individual CDS rates, indicating that these extracted factors are very good measures of
the systematic counterparty risk over time.
124.1. The TAF’s Eﬀect in Reducing Liquidity Premiums
For this moment let us assume that the counterparty risk premiums are uncorrelated with the
liquidity premiums, so that we can measure the TAF’s eﬀect in reducing banks’ liquidity concerns
by controlling for systematic counterparty risk. This assumption is also made by Taylor and
Williams (2008) and McAndrews et.al (2008). Regression results are reported in Table 2, with
t-statistics reported in the parentheses.
Not surprisingly, the systematic counterparty risk factors have substantial and statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the Libor spreads, indicating that much of the unusual widening in the
Libor spreads reﬂects heightened counterparty default risk. On the other hand, the TAF is
found to have substantially reduced ﬁnancial strains in the money market through lowering the
liquidity concerns. For instance, columns (1) and (2) suggest that the TAF has reduced the
1-month Libor-OIS spread by 26 to 31 basis points on average, and columns (3) and (4) indicate
an even larger eﬀect on the 3-month Libor-OIS spread. Moreover, all the TAF coeﬃcients are
statistically signiﬁcant at 5 percent level.
Such results contradict Taylor and Williams (2008), in which a similar regression study is
conducted and the TAF coeﬃcient estimates are generally positive and insigniﬁcant. The diﬀer-
ence in our results mainly stems from using diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the TAF dummy, reﬂecting
diﬀerent interpretations of how the TAF works. Taylor and Williams (2008) assume that the
only days on which the TAF may work are the bid submission days, and that the TAF has no
eﬀect in reducing the Libor-OIS spreads on the non-bidding days. However, note that the terms
loans under the TAF have a maturity of 28 or 35 days, so one would expect that such loans
would be able to relieve the ﬁnancial strains for the duration of the loans as the Federal Reserve
intended, i.e., four or ﬁve weeks, rather than only on one day. Moreover, the arrangement of
holding bi-weekly auctions ensures that the TAF loan periods always overlap, so that a certain
amount of term loans would always be kept in the market to reduce liquidity strains. Therefore,
it seems more appropriate to deﬁne the TAF dummy as equalling one for all trading days after
the TAF was established as described above, rather than only on the auction bidding days.
Further experiments conﬁrm this conjecture. When I replace the systematic default risk
factor in column (1) by the individual CDS rates for Bank of America (or Citi Group) as Taylor
and Williams (2008) chose, while keeping the TAF dummy deﬁnition unchanged, the estimated
TAF coeﬃcient is still signiﬁcantly negative, at -0.26 (or -0.22). In other words, if we run
13Taylor and Williams’ regressions with a re-deﬁned TAF dummy, the estimation results would
still indicate a statistically signiﬁcant TAF eﬀect in reducing Libor-OIS spreads.
4.2. The TAF’s Eﬀect in Reducing the Counterparty Risk Premiums
Next I evaluate the TAF’s eﬀect in reducing systematic counterparty risk premiums. As equa-
tions (3.18) and (3.19) suggest, the systematic default risk premiums may be determined by a
broad range of macro and ﬁnancial variables, including aggregate risks posed by the macroecon-
omy and ﬁnancial markets. To this end, I examine three measures of aggregate uncertainty in
the regressions: the Merrill Lynch MOVE index to measure the implied volatility in the longer-
term U.S. Treasury market, the VIX measure of implied volatility from options on the S&P
500 index to measure uncertainty in the stock market, and the implied volatility from 3-month
Eurodollar options to measure the uncertainty about the near-term path of monetary policy.
To control for the underlying subprime mortgage risk, I also construct a “mortgage default
risk” factor, deﬁned as the ﬁrst principal component of the individual CDS rates for a group
of the largest subprime mortgage lenders, mortgage bond insurers, and residential construction
companies. These ﬁrms represent sectors that are most heavily exposed to subprime mortgage
market turmoil, but have no access to the TAF or the TSLF. Therefore their CDS rates are
an ideal measure of the underlying mortgage default risk and should help identifying the TAF
and the TSLF eﬀects. Chart 5 displays the constructed “mortgage default risk” factor and the
individual CDS rate for a selected group of these mortgage-related companies.
Tables 3 and 4 report the regression results for modeling the systematic default risk factors
for commercial and investment banks, respectively. I ﬁrst conduct a preliminary analysis of
the importance of various macroeconomic and ﬁnancial-market volatilities and mortgage risk
by regressing the Libor spreads on each of these variables (columns 1 to 4). All the coeﬃcients
on the three volatility variables are positive and signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, and the adjusted
R2 is around 85 percent or even higher, indicating a strong correlation between the heightened
uncertainties in the macroeconomy and ﬁnancial markets and the increased counterparty risk
premiums among major ﬁnancial institutions. In addition, the constructed “mortgage default
risk” factor also has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on counterparty risk premiums in the Libor
market, as one would anticipate (column 4). When all four volatility or risk measures are
included in a multivariate regression, as shown in column 5, coeﬃcients of the MOVE index and
14the mortgage default risk factor remain positive and signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, but coeﬃcients
of the VIX and Euro dollar volatility become less signiﬁcant, suggesting that the uncertainty on
the longer-term Treasury market and the mortgage default risk are more closely correlated with
ﬁnancial strains in the Libor market.
On the other hand, the point estimates of the TAF and the TSLF coeﬃcients are positive
in most cases, suggesting that the Fed’s new lending facilities have not been able to reduce
the counterparty default risk premiums. This could result from the fact that the constructed
“mortgage default risk” factor is still not a perfect measure and may only capture part of the
heightened mortgage default risk. For instance, it may suﬀer a truncation problem, in the sense
that the observed CDS rates are all those from the survived subprime mortgage-exposed ﬁrms,
and do not incorporate the highly risky ones which already went bankruptcy or whose CDS
were stopped trading. Therefore, in running the regressions, a substantial part of the soaring
counterparty risk in the money market is left unexplained by the “mortgage default risk” factor
and is passed onto the coeﬃcient estimates of the two dummy variables, thus yielding a spurious
positive sign. This can also be seen from the observation that, when the constructed “mortgage
default risk” factor is not included in the regressions (columns 1 to 3 in both tables), the TAF and
TSLF coeﬃcients are large and statistically signiﬁcant; but when the constructed “mortgage
default risk” factor is included so that part of the counterparty default risk is accounted for
by the “mortgage default risk” factor (columns 4 to 6), the TAF and the TSLF coeﬃcient
estimates become smaller, not statistically signiﬁcant, and in some cases negative. On the other
hand, one may argue that these regression results still indicate that the TAF and the TSLF do
not have a very strong eﬀect in lowering the counterparty risk premiums, at least not strong
enough to oﬀset the eﬀects from the elevated mortgage default risk which are not captured by
the constructed “mortgage default risk” factor.
4.3. The Overall Eﬀect of the TAF, the TSLF and the PDCF
Finally I proceed to quantify the overall eﬀect of the TAF, the TSLF and the PDCF in relieving
the ﬁnancial stress in the Libor market, both through relieving banks’ funding liquidity concerns
and lowering their counterparty risk premiums. Again, as guided by equation (4.1), I regress the
1-month and 3-month Libor-OIS spreads on a set of variables measuring the overall macroeco-
nomic and ﬁnancial market volatilities, as well as the constructed “mortgage default risk” factor.
15However, I do not control for counterparty risk premiums in running the regressions, because we
w o u l dl i k et ot a k ei n t oa c c o u n tt h eT A Fa n dt h eT S L F ’ se ﬀects on such risk premiums. For the
same reason, I choose not to include a measure of t h ev o l a t i l i t yo ft h eL i b o r - O I Ss p r e a di nt h e
regressions, as the TAF and the TSLF may also work through lowering Libor spread volatility,
thereby lowering risk premiums and the level of Libor spread.
Again, I ﬁrst run a set of univariate regressions, examining the individual correlations be-
tween the Libor spreads and various volatility and risk measures. Two diﬀerent speciﬁcations
are adopted in the estimation, in which the TAF (and the TSLF) dummy enters either as an
independent regressor, or through the interactions with one of the volatility or risk measures.
These two speciﬁcations aim to describe two diﬀerent channels for the new liquidity facilities
to aﬀect money market conditions: either by directly lowering the Libor spreads by a ﬁxed
amount, or by proportionally lowering the impact of heightened mortgage risk as well as macro
and ﬁnancial volatilities on Libor spreads.
Tables 5 and 6 report the univariate regression results for the 1-month and 3-month spreads,
respectively. These regressions use a pre-TSLF sample running from January 1, 2007 to March
10, 2008, the day prior to the announcement of the TSLF. In both speciﬁcations, coeﬃcient
estimates of all four volatility and risk measures are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at 1
percent level, as one would expect. Moreover, the TAF dummy coeﬃcient estimates are all
negative and signiﬁcant at 1 percent level in most cases, indicating signiﬁcant TAF eﬀects in
narrowing the Libor-OIS spreads.
Next I run a set of multivariate regressions, including both the TAF dummy and the TSLF
dummy, based on the whole sample period. As shown in Tables 7 and 8 for 1-month and 3-
month spreads, respectively, the volatility of the longer-term Treasury market (MOVE) has the
strongest and most statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect contributing to ﬁnancial strains in the Libor
market. Other volatility measures and the mortgage default risk measure have much smaller
eﬀects and most of them are insigniﬁcant. In particular, the VIX coeﬃc i e n te s t i m a t ei ss l i g h t l y
negative, possibly capturing a “ﬂight to quality” eﬀect reﬂecting investors’ tendency to move
assets from stock market into money market when the volatility of the stock market increases.
The coeﬃcient of the “mortgage default risk factor” also becomes negative, possibly due to the
fact that the constructed factor is not a perfect measure of the overall mortgage default risk and
may underestimate increases in overall mortgage default risk (e.g., truncation problem discussed
16above). For this reason, its eﬀect is also likely underestimated.
On the other hand, the TAF is found to have substantial and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects
in narrowing Libor-OIS spreads. In particular, after controlling for various macroeconomic and
ﬁnancial volatility and risk measures, the TAF has on average reduced the 1-month Libor-OIS
spread by 31 basis points, and the 3-month Libor-OIS spread by 44 basis points (columns 1 and
3 in Tables 7 and 8). Moreover, when the TAF dummy enters the equation through interactions
with the volatility and risk measures (columns 2 and 4 in Tables 7 and 8), most of the coeﬃcient
estimates of the interactions are negative and signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, conﬁrming a strong
TAF eﬀect in lowering the Libor-OIS spreads. The high adjusted R2’s (65-79 percent in 1-month
Libor spreads and 73-89 percent in 3-month Libor spreads) even without including the CDS rates
for major ﬁnancial institutions or autoregressive terms in the regressions, indicate that these
variables account for much of the variation in Libor spreads.3 Moreover, it is interesting to note
that, of the two model speciﬁcations, the one in which the TAF and the TSLF enter through
interactions with other volatility or risk measures does a noticeably better job in explaining the
variation in the Libor spreads than the one in which they enter as independent regressors.
However, there is less evidence of a discernible eﬀect of the TSLF and the PDCF in lowering
the Libor spreads. Columns (3) in both tables report a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
TSLF coeﬃcient estimates, and most of the coeﬃcients estimates of the TSLF interactions
are also positive. The only negative and signiﬁcant TSLF coeﬃcient estimate occurs in its
interactions with the MOVE index. This negative evaluation of the TSLF and the PDCF could
simply result from a lack of enough observations since these two new facilities were introduced
only in March 2008, around the same time the money market turbulence became elevated again.
On the other hand, this result may also suggest that the TSLF and the PDCF have been a less
eﬀective policy tool than the TAF has been so far. Such a conclusion is consistent with the
market observations that the primary dealers showed a weaker interest in using the TSLF than
banks have shown in tapping the TAF. Indeed, in two out of the ﬁve TSLF auctions conducted
through early May 2008 (on April 10, 2008 and April 24, 2008, respectively), the submitted
bidding amount at the TSLF auction was indeed substantially lower than the amount oﬀered
by the Fed.
3For robustness check, I also ran regressions including the lagged Libor spreads in the equation and obtained
the same conclusions. The only diﬀerence is that the implied eﬀects of the TAF and the TSLF in the autoregressive
models are even larger than those reported here.
17Finally, as both Taylor and Williams (2008) and McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008) have
adopted an event-study approach and analyzed the TAF eﬀect on the TAF auction days, I assess
the auction-day eﬀects of the TAF as well. To this end, I deﬁne another dummy variable for
the TAF bid submission days, in the same way as Taylor and Williams (2008), and run the
regressions based on the pre-TSLF sub-sample. As shown in Table 9, the bid submission-day
eﬀect is quite limited: on such days, on average the extra TAF eﬀect only reduces the 1-month
Libor-OIS spread by less than 3 basis points, and the 3-month Libor-OIS spread by about 3
or 6 basis points, and such eﬀects are statistically insigniﬁcant. This result is consistent with
other authors’ ﬁndings, and is not surprising at all. Indeed, in principle one should not expect a
strong TAF bidding-day eﬀect, because the TAF auctions including the auction dates, amounts,
and other auction terms are all announced well in advance, so the actual auctions can hardly be
any “surprise” to a rational market. Indeed, by its design, the TAF facility was not intended to
aﬀect money market conditions on only TAF auction days.
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the eﬀectiveness of the new liquidity facilities that the Federal Reserve
established in response to the recent ﬁnancial crisis. I develop a no-arbitrage based aﬃne term
structure model with default risk and conduct a thorough factor analysis of the counterparty
default risk among major ﬁnancial institutions and the underlying mortgage default risk. The
new facilities’ eﬀectiveness is examined, by ﬁrst separately examining their eﬀects in relieving
ﬁnancial institutions’ liquidity concerns and reducing the counterparty risk premiums, and then
quantifying their overall eﬀects in reducing ﬁnancial strains in the inter-bank money market.
Empirical results indicate that the Term Auction Facility (TAF) has a strong eﬀect in re-
ducing ﬁnancial strains in the inter-bank money market, primarily through relieving ﬁnancial
institutions’ liquidity concerns. Heightened uncertainty regarding the macroeconomy, ﬁnancial
markets, and mortgage default risk have signiﬁcantly raised counterparty risk premiums among
ﬁnancial institutions, but have had little eﬀect on their liquidity premiums. The Term Securities
Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), however, are found to
have had less discernible eﬀects so far in relieving ﬁnancial strains in the Libor market. This is
consistent with market observations of a weaker interest from primary dealers in participating
in the TSLF auctions than banks have shown in tapping the TAF.
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19Table 1: Federal Reserve’s Toolbox
Open Market Discount Window TAF TSLF PDCF
Operations
Agents primary dealers depository institutions depository institutions primary dealers primary dealers
Rate charged Fed. funds rate discount rate through auction through auction discount rate
Term of loans overnight overnight, extended 28 or 35 days 28 days overnight, renewable to
to 90 days up to 120 days
Renewability – renewable – – renewable
Eligible collateral Treasury or gov’t Treasury, gov’t & same as discount window AAA-rated MBS same as discount window,
agency securities investment-grade private and asset-backed but no loans or synthetic
issues and bank loans securities securities
Frequency daily daily bi-weekly weekly dailyTable 2: TAF’s Eﬀect on Libor-OIS Spread
1-month Libor-OIS spread 3-month Libor-OIS spread
( 1 )( 2 ) ( 3 )( 4 )
Bank default 0.1099∗∗ 0.1525∗∗
risk (5.1532) (9.2299)
Investment bank 0.1482∗∗ 0.1869∗∗
default risk (4.5947) (4.9270)
TAF dummy -0.3068∗ -0.2646∗ -0.4001∗∗ -0.2576∗
(-2.3995) (-2.3316) (-4.1989) (-2.4189)
Adj. R2 0.3249 0.3579 0.5175 0.4866
Note: t-statistics are displayed in parentheses (based on Newey-West standard errors). *(**) denotes
statistical signiﬁcance at the 95% (99%) conﬁdence level.
21Table 3: Counterparty Default Risk Among Major Commercial Banks
Systematic Bank Default Risk Factor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MOVE 0.0396∗∗ 0.0196∗∗ 0.0173∗∗
(11.4721) (4.3675) (3.9827)
VIX 0.1711∗∗ -0.0039 0.0320
(9.8595) (-0.2033) (1.6338)
Euro $ volatility 0.0892∗∗ -0.0346∗ -0.0375∗
(8.3740) (-2.2125) (-2.4921)
Mortgage default 0.3029∗∗ 0.3091∗∗ 0.2503∗∗
risk (14.9570) (10.1367) (5.8438)
TAF dummy 1.8130∗∗ 3.0250∗∗ 1.9304∗∗ 0.3411 0.6936∗
(5.3571) (11.4127) (4.3101) (0.9147) (1.9730)
TSLF dummy 0.9995∗∗ 0.9898∗∗ 0.8680∗ 0.5261 0.6760
(2.7865) (2.6692) (2.0231) (0.9559) (1.3270)
Adj. R2 0.8785 0.8667 0.8445 0.8992 0.8999 0.9006
Note: t-statistics are displayed in parentheses (based on Newey-West standard errors). *(**) denotes
statistical signiﬁcance at the 95% (99%) conﬁdence level.
Table 4: Counterparty Default Risk Among Major Investment Banks
Systematic Investment Bank Default Risk Factor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MOVE 0.0334∗∗ 0.0098∗∗ 0.0112∗∗
(21.1859) (2.9477) (3.6878)
VIX 0.1441∗∗ 0.0298∗ 0.0455∗∗
(22.2492) (2.4652) (4.4356)
Euro $ volatility 0.0856∗∗ 0.0289∗ 0.0218∗
(15.1269) (2.0149) (2.2122)
Mortgage default 0.2189∗∗ 0.0965∗∗ 0.0575∗∗
risk (25.9548) (5.8137) (2.5811)
TAF dummy 0.3632∗ 1.3796∗∗ 0.1900 -0.3941 0.1218
(2.0539) (6.7718) (0.7790) (-1.6664) (0.7149)
TSLF dummy 2.5489∗∗ 2.4828∗∗ 2.3756∗∗ 2.2559∗ 2.3351∗∗
(3.1161) (2.8348) (3.0161) (2.3522) (2.8070)
Adj. R2 0.8798 0.8672 0.8628 0.8475 0.8316 0.8886
Note: t-statistics are displayed in parentheses (based on Newey-West standard errors). *(**) denotes
statistical signiﬁcance at the 95% (99%) conﬁdence level.
22Table 5: Overall Eﬀects of the New Liquidity Facilities: 1-month Libor-OIS Spread, Univariate Regressions
1-month Libor-OIS spread
MOVE VIX Euro $ volatility Mortgage default risk
MOVE 0.0094∗∗ 0.0098∗∗
(12.7633) (13.6815)














TAF dummy -0.4521∗∗ -0.0707 -0.2002∗ -0.3470∗
(-6.4950) (-1.0925) (-1.7377) (-2.2395)
Adj. R2 0.6371 0.6580 0.3850 0.3923 0.2778 0.4467 0.2324 0.3364
Note: t-statistics are displayed in parentheses (based on Newey-West standard errors). All columns are based on observations prior
to March 11, 2008. *(**) denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 95% (99%) conﬁdence level.Table 6: Overall Eﬀects of the New Liquidity Facilities: 3-month Libor-OIS Spread, Univariate Regressions
3-month Libor-OIS spread
MOVE VIX Euro $ volatility Mortgage default risk
MOVE 0.0110∗∗ 0.0115∗∗
(22.2242) (27.1751)














TAF dummy -0.4424∗∗ -0.0241 -0.2227∗ -0.4825∗∗
(-8.5758) (-0.4275) (-1.9742) (-3.6095)
Adj. R2 0.7559 0.7776 0.5598 0.5625 0.4560 0.6322 0.4609 0.5746
Note: t-statistics are displayed in parentheses (based on Newey-West standard errors). All columns are based on observations prior to
March 11, 2008. *(**) denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 95% (99%) conﬁdence level.Table 7: Overall Eﬀects of the New Liquidity Facilities:
1-month Libor-OIS Spread, Multivariate Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MOVE 0.0139∗∗ 0.0116∗∗ 0.0128∗∗ 0.0114∗∗





VIX -0.0022 -0.0206∗∗ -0.0043 -0.0214∗∗





Euro $ volatility -0.0045 0.0153∗∗ -0.0041 0.0161∗∗
(-1.2020) (3.6640) (-1.0666) (3.8236)




Mortgage default -0.0239∗∗ -0.0203∗ -0.0173∗ -0.0193∗









Adj. R2 0.6917 0.7800 0.6422 0.7855
Note: t-statistics are displayed in parentheses (based on Newey-West standard errors). Columns (1)
and (2) are based on observations prior to March 11, 2008. *(**) denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the
95% (99%) conﬁdence level.
25Table 8: Overall Eﬀects of the New Liquidity Facilities:
3-month Libor-OIS Spread, Multivariate Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MOVE 0.0123∗∗ 0.0086∗∗ 0.0114∗∗ 0.0084∗∗





VIX -0.0017 -0.0264∗∗ -0.0029 -0.0272∗∗





Euro $ volatility -0.0028 0.0249∗∗ -0.0031 0.0255∗∗
(-0.7065) (9.7520) (-0.7853) (9.8939)




Mortgage default -0.0004 0.0072 0.0051 0.0080









Adj. R2 0.7474 0.8827 0.7250 0.8849
Note: t-statistics are displayed in parentheses (based on Newey-West standard errors). Columns (1)
and (2) are based on observations prior to March 11, 2008. *(**) denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the
95% (99%) conﬁdence level.
26Table 9: TAF Bidding-day Eﬀect
1-month Libor-OIS spread 3-month Libor-OIS spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MOVE 0.0136∗∗ 0.0136∗∗ 0.0113∗∗ 0.0113∗∗ 0.0126∗∗ 0.0127∗∗ 0.0092∗∗ 0.0092∗∗
(10.8271) (10.8354) (7.3765) (7.3747) (15.2081) (15.3852) (10.9366) (10.9519)
MOVE*TAF -0.0021 -0.0020 -0.0016 -0.0015∗∗
(-1.0803) (-1.0701) (-1.2951) (-5.8306)
VIX -0.0060 -0.0061 -0.0233∗∗ -0.0233∗∗ 0.0007 0.0006 -0.0239∗∗ -0.0239∗∗
(-1.2015) (-1.2144) (-4.3756) (-4.3753) (0.1433) (0.1126) (-5.8351) (10.2588)
VIX*TAF 0.0243∗ 0.0243∗ 0.0367∗∗ 0.0363
(2.4232) (2.4120) (4.5772) (-1.2069)
Euro $ volatility -0.0097∗∗ -0.0097∗∗ 0.0115∗∗ 0.0115∗∗ -0.0054∗ -0.0054∗ 0.0249∗∗ 0.0249∗∗
(-3.2918) (-3.2874) (3.2042) (3.2019) (-1.8239) (-1.8375) (10.2692) (4.5323)
Euro*TAF -0.0265∗∗ -0.0265∗∗ -0.0389∗∗ -0.0389∗∗
(-6.0043) (-6.0030) (-12.5748) (-12.5898)
TAF dummy -0.4337∗∗ -0.4311∗∗ -0.4121∗∗ -0.4062∗∗
(-6.5528) (-6.5536) (-7.0943) (-6.9668)
TAF bidding day -0.0266 -0.0023 -0.0620 -0.0329
dummy (-0.3875) (-0.0411) (-0.9080) (-0.7526)
Adj. R2 0.6814 0.6794 0.7489 0.7465 0.7593 0.7578 0.8686 0.8661
Note: t-statistics are displayed in parentheses (based on Newey-West standard errors). All columns are based on observations prior to
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